Abstract. Eugene Wigner's much discussed notion of the "unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics" in describing the physics of empirical reality is simultaneously both trivial and profound. After all, the relevant mathematics was, (in the first instance), originally developed in order to be useful in describing empirical reality. On the other hand, certain aspects of the mathematical superstructure have now taken on a life of their own, with at least some features of the mathematical superstructure greatly exceeding anything that can be directly probed or verified, or even justified, by empirical experiment. Specifically, I wish to raise the possibility that the real number system, (with its nevertheless pragmatically very useful tools of real analysis, and mathematically rigorous notions of differentiation and integration), may nevertheless constitute a "wrong turn" when it comes to modelling empirical reality. Without making any definitive recommendation, I shall discuss several alternatives.
Introduction
Half a century ago Eugene Wigner introduced the idea of the "unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics" [1] when it comes to describing the physics of empirical reality -this is an extremely tricky issue that bears repeated re-examination. There are definitely very many powerful assumptions built into modern mathematics, and specifically that part of mathematics used for investigating physics, and only some of these assumptions can be asserted to be solidly based on direct empirical input. While the many and varied successes of modern physics clearly indicate we are doing something right, the very fact that there is also a long list of things that we do not know how to do (both in physics and mathematics) suggests that we might wish to double check for possible "wrong turns" in the development of the status quo.
Pre-calculus
When studying pre-calculus mathematics one encounters an extremely natural progression of number systems:
• Counting numbers, {1, 2, 3, . . .};
• Natural numbers, {0, 1, 2, 3, . . .};
• Integers, {. . . , −3, −2, −1, 0, +1, +2, +3, . . .};
• Rational numbers;
• Real numbers;
• Complex numbers.
The first three stages in this progression, (the counting numbers, natural numbers, and integers), are extremely closely tied to empirical reality, essentially just being mathematical formalizations of the physical notion of the existence of discrete and separate objects in the observable universe. (Though even then, the implicit notion of infinity hiding in these number systems might give some people pause for concern.) However, already once one moves to the rational numbers, (while no-one should dispute the usefulness of the resulting mathematics), there is a very real and nontrivial question as to how closely they model empirical reality. Since the rational numbers are "infinitely divisible", if one uses the rationals to model space and time, then one is making very strong physical assumptions regarding the empirical physical structure of space-time, effectively, that there is an infinitely divisible space-time.
Viewed in hindsight, (and with a modern change of terminology), that no-one was too worried about this issue for several millennia can be inferred from the fact that Euclid's axioms [2] of geometry explicitly allowed for "infinitely divisible" line segments, (and so implicitly allowed, at the very least, what might now be called "rational-coordinate Cartesian geometry"). Of course Euclid's axioms assert much more than this, naturally leading to number systems considerably more complicated than the rationals, but still simpler than the reals -and I will have much more to say about this later.
Calculus
Much more recently, somewhat over 300 years ago, Newton [3] and Leibniz [4] developed the differential and integral calculus as general purpose mathematical tools. (The calculus was developed largely for calculating slopes and volumes -thereby extending the "method of exhaustion" developed by the ancient Greeks [5, 6] ; and also for the extremely practical purpose of predicting planetary orbits). Putting these pragmatic tools on a rigourous footing, (as Berkeley asked: "What, pray tell, are these differentials, these ghosts of departed quantities?" [7] ), took well over a century, and led Dedekind, Cauchy, Weirstrauss, and numerous others to develop and codify the real number system -with its associated theory of real analysis and mathematically rigourous theories of differentiation and integration [8, 9, 10] . No-one can reasonably doubt the pragmatic effectiveness (the possibly "unreasonable effectiveness") of real analysis [1] -just consider the theory of ordinary and partial differential equations, the associated existence and uniqueness results, and the vast body of mathematical physics that has grown up over the last few centuries -almost all of which is based on straightforward application of real analysis (or its offspring, complex analysis).
But, and this is a very big but, the very successfulness of real analysis relies upon the fact that the real number system is a mathematical idealization, (not a physical model), that is by that stage very far removed from empirical reality of how one might actually make measurements, and so is very far removed from experimental verifiability. How, pray tell, might one go about experimentally verifying the implicit claim underlying the use of real analysis in physics -the implicit claim that the measurements made by physical clocks and rulers are adequately characterized by the real number system? (And more subtly, the implicit claim that one needs the entire real number system to adequately characterize physical measurements.)
Other number systems
Closely related to this question is the fact, (typically ignored in the training of most physicists), that there is a whole hierarchy of number systems lying between the rational numbers and the real numbers, and that it might be that one of these other number systems has more claim to be operationally relevant to physics.
Some of the other number systems are:
• The field of quadratic surds, (q 1 + √ q 2 , where q 1 and q 2 are rational);
• Constructible numbers, (constructible in Euclidean geometry using straight-edge and compass);
• Algebraic numbers, (built from the roots of integer coefficient polynomials);
• Computable numbers [recursive numbers, computable reals], (a computable number c can be approximated to arbitrary specified rational accuracy ǫ with a rational number q generated by some computable function: so q = f (c, ǫ) with |c − f (c, ǫ)| < ǫ);
• Definable numbers [first-order definable without parameters], (a definable number is set theoretically definable as the quantity that makes some set-theoretic function "true").
These particular number fields all share the property of being countable; while they all extend the rationals, their cardinality is the same as the rationals, and by Cantor's diagonalization argument their cardinality is less than that of the reals -in this sense they are closer to the rationals than the reals. (And in this sense the possible use of such number systems would be an aspect of the great modern divide between "discrete" and "continuum" mathematics; in physics language consider the "discretium" versus the "continuum".) One might hope, (though at this stage it is little more than a rather pious hope), that the reduced cardinality might in some way simplify life.
The "best" number system?
Could any of these number systems be "better" than the reals when it comes to doing physics? Is any one of them clearly superior to the others? Ultimately this is an entirely pragmatic question that depends on various trade-offs -in particular how much of standard real analysis survives in these smaller number systems? Does one have, or can one construct, good notions of integration and differentiation? Alternatively, instead of the usual theory of differential equations, can one at the very least develop a coherent theory of finite difference equations over these number systems? Overall, the situation is very much less than clear, and I will not provide any specific definitive answers -there are several abstract mathematical attempts at developing alternatives to real analysis, but I will leave technical details as an exercise for one's favourite search engine -at this stage I wish merely to raise suitable questions, and to encourage some thought along these lines. Specifically, there is a certain lack of clarity as to which of these number systems to focus on, and the physics community might most profitably contribute to the discussion by developing some consensus as to the minimum requirements for a physically acceptable number system.
For instance, it is periodically mooted that one could get away with only using the rational numbers -but there is an extremely high price to pay for this, which is maybe just too high -if one naively asserts that all lengths (or more precisely length ratios) are describable by rational numbers then one already has excluded the 1, 1, √ 2 rightangled triangle from the physical universe (and so has implicitly eliminated 45 degree angles from the physical universe). This observation (suitably repackaged) essentially goes back to the ancient Pythagorean proof of the irrationality of √ 2, and does seem to suggest that, (if one first accepts the rationals themselves as being "physical"), then something beyond the rationals would be a good idea. More precisely, this would seem to focus attention on the constructible numbers.
However, even then, one has to decide precisely which construction techniques are allowable. For instance, with marked edge and compass, (as opposed to straight edge and compass), it is well-known that one can trisect arbitrary angles [11] , and also double the cube [12] . (One could also use Origami techniques to trisect arbitrary angles and to double the cube [13] .) In a similar vein, if one is allowed to mark the edge of a circle, and roll it along a straight line, (thus employing a surveyor's wheel/hodometer/waywiser), then constructing two line segments whose lengths are in the ratio π is trivial. Such a procedure is implicit in Archimedes theorem that the area of a circle equals the area of a right angled triangle whose base is the circumference of the circle and whose height is the radius of the circle. Once this preliminary step is done then one certainly can square the circle. The point is that exactly which set of constructible numbers one obtains very much depends on a precise specification of the allowed construction techniques.
Empirical guidance?
Perhaps more operationally, any physical experiment can be viewed as a finite-resource algorithm applied to the universe that returns some finite-precision result; and any finite-precision number can be viewed as a rational number. This point of view would suggest the relevance of the computable number system, or possibly some sub-sector thereof. (One may wish to think carefully as to whether all computable functions can be simulated by physical experiments, or whether physical experiments only probe a subset of the computable functions. One might also wish to think carefully on the ultimate limits of precision of the experimental method.)
Of course there are yet other possibilities:
• As very briefly outlined above, one could try to construct yet more number systems, "between" the rationals and the reals.
• If one is deeply offended by any notion of infinity, then even a countable number system might be too much to contemplate -one could always resort to finite fields (Galois fields [14] ), but one would have to choose an awfully big finite field.
(Since the ratio of the Planck length to the Hubble scale is ≈ 10 60 , each spacetime coordinate would presumably lie in some number system with 10 60 distinct elements.)
• If one even objects to using mathematical number fields, then there are always finite geometries to play with, or more abstractly finite matroids [15] .
(With, in 4 spacetime dimensions, (10 60 ) 4 = 10 240 distinct points or elements respectively -though the very concept of a finite matroid with 10 240 distinct elements is likely to seriously perturb several of my colleagues.)
• In the other direction one could go to an extreme even larger than the reals -such as the hyper-reals of nonstandard analysis [16] . Of course this is moving even further afield from empirical reality, (or more precisely, further from things one can think of measuring directly), so most physicists would demand very good reasons -some very high payoff -for moving in such a direction.
• I should also (extremely briefly) mention the p-adics. Let us just say that their direct connection to empirical reality seems to be a little strained [17] .
I emphasise that one of the key distinctions we can make is between number systems of finite (but large) cardinality, countable cardinality, and uncountable cardinality.
Discussion
The much discussed "unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics" in describing empirical reality [1] is subject to a number of significant caveats -exactly which particular aspect of mathematics is it that is so unreasonably effective? There are several distinct mathematical frameworks [number systems] that might plausibly be used to model empirical reality, and given the current state of affairs physicists can still reasonably agree to differ on which is "best". My personal judgment of the most likely place to look is this: The jump from rationals to reals, though mathematically very well motivated, might not physically be the most appropriate step to take. There are many number systems intermediate in strength between the rationals and the reals, and one of these intermediate number systems, (most probably one of countable cardinality), might plausibly provide a better way of modelling empirical reality. Physically these questions become interesting if and only if one can develop a compelling mathematical alternative to real analysis (in particular, to classical differentiation and integration) that is powerful enough to allow us to do interesting things, but (hopefully) is simple enough, and different enough, to lead to compelling new physics. There is a rich vein of interesting ideas here, one to which both mathematicians and physicists could usefully contribute.
